Description Common Laptops and desktops PCs are also vulnerable to Side-Channel attacks, what can be measured by SDR receivers.

In case of RSA with the Chinese Remainder Theorem it is possible to extract one of the secret primes to break RSA. This talk will present a simple attack implementation based on GNURadio.

Tags rsa, sdr, side-channel, dpa
Person organizing Bolek42
Language en - English
en - English
Duration 5
Desired session Day 3


Based on the work of Genkin et. Al. "Stealing Keys from PCs using a Radio" this talk will present a Side-Channel-Attack against RSA with the Chinese Remainder Theorem. It focuses on OpenSSL running on common Laptops or Desktop PCs, by using a Differential Power Analysis to detect changes in the spectrogram. These are caused by a varying program flow, that depends on the modular reduction by one of the secret Primes of the RSA private key. A binary search will be used to extract one of these primes bit by bit, resulting in a breach of RSA in less than 8 hours for a 2048-bit RSA.