Schedule

Schedule
























 

Day 1
12:00

12:30

13:00

13:30

14:00

14:30

15:00

15:30

16:00

16:30

17:00

17:30

18:00

18:30

19:00

19:30

20:00

20:30

21:00

21:30

22:00

22:30

23:00

23:30
ACE up the sleeve: Hacking into Apple's new USB-C Controller (en)

stacksmashing

With the iPhone 15 & iPhone 15 Pro, Apple switched their iPhone to USB-C and introduced a new USB-C controller: The ACE3, a powerful, very custom, TI manufactured chip. But the ACE3 does more than just handle USB power delivery: It's a full microcontroller running a full USB stack connected to some of the internal busses of the device, and is responsible for providing access to JTAG of the application processor, the internal SPMI bus, etc. We start by investigating the previous variant of the ACE3: The ACE2. It's based on a known chip, and using a combination of a hardware vulnerability in MacBooks and a custom macOS kernel module we managed to persistently backdoor it - even surviving full-system restores. On the ACE3 however, Apple upped their game: Firmware updates are personalized to the device, debug interfaces seem to be disabled, and the external flash is validated and does not contain all the firmware. However using a combination of reverse-engineering, RF side-channel analysis and electro-magnetic fault-injection it was possible to gain code-execution on the ACE3 - allowing dumping of the ROM, and analysis of the functionality. This talk will show how to use a combination of hardware, firmware, reverse-engineering, side-channel analysis and fault-injection to gain code-execution on a completely custom chip, enabling further security research on an under-explored but security relevant part of Apple devices. It will also demonstrate attacks on the predecessor of the ACE3.

EU's Digital Identity Systems - Reality Check and Techniques for Better Privacy (en)

Anja Lehmann, socialhack

Digital identity solutions, such as proposed through the EU's eIDAS regulation, are reshaping the way users authenticate online. In this talk, we will review the currently proposed technical designs, the impact such systems will have, and provide an outlook on how techniques from modern cryptography can help to improve security and privacy.

Breaking NATO Radio Encryption (en)

Lukas Stennes

We present fatal security flaws in the HALFLOOP-24 encryption algorithm, which is used by the US military and NATO. HALFLOOP-24 was meant to safeguard the automatic link establishment protocol in high frequency radio, but our research demonstrates that merely two hours of intercepted radio traffic are sufficient to recover the secret key. In the talk, we start with the fundamentals of symmetric key cryptography before going into the details of high frequency radio, HALFLOOP-24, and the foundation of our attack.

What the PHUZZ?! Finding 0-days in Web Applications with Coverage-guided Fuzzing (en)

Sebastian Neef (gehaxelt)

PHUZZ is a framework for Coverage-Guided Fuzzing of PHP Web Applications Fuzz testing is an automated approach to vulnerability discovery. Coverage-guided fuzz testing has been extensively researched in binary applications and the domain of memory corruption vulnerabilities. However, many web vulnerability scanners still rely on black-box fuzzing (e.g., predefined sets of payloads or basic heuristics), which severely limits their vulnerability detection capabilities. In this talk, we present our academic fuzzing framework, "PHUZZ," and the challenges we faced in bringing coverage-guided fuzzing to PHP web applications. Our experiments show that PHUZZ outperforms related works and state-of-the-art vulnerability scanners in discovering seven different vulnerability classes. Additionally, we demonstrate how PHUZZ uncovered over 20 potential security issues and two 0-day vulnerabilities in a large-scale fuzzing campaign of the most popular WordPress plugins.

From fault injection to RCE: Analyzing a Bluetooth tracker (en)

Nicolas Oberli

The Chipolo ONE is a Bluetooth tracker built around the Dialog (now Renesas) DA14580 chip. This talk will present the research made on this device, from extracting the firmware from the locked down chip using fault injection up to getting remote code execution over Bluetooth. The talk will also present the disclosure process and how the vendor reacted to an unpatchable vulnerability on their product.

Hacking the RP2350 (en)

Aedan Cullen

Raspberry Pi's RP2350 microcontroller introduced a multitude of new hardware security features over the RP2040, and included a Hacking Challenge which began at DEF CON to encourage researchers to find bugs. The challenge has been defeated and the chip is indeed vulnerable (in at least one way). This talk will cover the process of discovering this vulnerability, the method of exploiting it, and avenues for deducing more about the relevant low-level hardware behavior.

Archived page - Impressum/Datenschutz