Real-world exploits and mitigations in Large Language Model applications
Johann Rehberger
With the rapid growth of AI and Large Language Models users are facing an increased risk of scams, data exfiltration, loss of PII, and even remote code execution. This talk will demonstrate many real-world exploits the presenter discovered, including discussion of mitigations and fixes vendors put in place for the most prominent LLM applications, including ChatGPT, Bing Chat and Google Bard.
beyond the trivial
Ilja van Sprundel
In this talk, we delve into the captivating realm of TCP/IP stack fuzzing. As the backbone of internet communication, the TCP/IP stack is a prime target for cyber threats. This presentation will unravel the intricacies of fuzzing techniques applied to several TCP/IP stacks, shedding light on how these methodologies can uncover bugs, crashes and vulnerabilities. From the fundamentals of packet fuzzing to advanced mutation strategies, attendees will gain valuable insights into the proactive ways to fuzz a TCP/IP stack. Whether you're a seasoned cybersecurity professional or a curious enthusiast, this talk promises to be an enlightening journey into the heart of TCP/IP stack security and the crucial role of fuzzing in safeguarding our interconnected world.
Uncovering fake base stations on iOS devices
lukasarnld
Your phone’s internal communication contains precious data. It can be analyzed to detect fake base stations used in cellular attacks. For that, we reverse-engineered a proprietary communication channel between the phone’s OS and modem.
Wie man Stalkerware und Staatstrojaner auf Smartphones finden kann
vik3000
Smartphones sind in den letzten zehn Jahren zu einem allseits beliebten Angriffsziel geworden, sei es für Stalkerware, Staatstrojaner oder Banking-Malware. In diesem Vortrag wollen wir einen Überblick geben, mit welchen Techniken und Open-Source-Tools man auf Smartphones (unter iOS und Android) auf die Jagd nach Malware gehen kann. Im Anschluss findet ein Workshop mit einem praktischen Teil zum Ausprobieren einiger dieser Techniken statt.
A Beginner’s Guide
Christoph Wolff, Pascal Zenker
This introductory session will outline the process of hacking internet-connected devices, with the help of a real world example: Poly telephones and conference speaker systems. We will explain vulnerabilities we identified in them and how they can be leveraged to transform the devices into wiretaps.
using my blog as example
Fefe
I have previously given talks about security principles and approaches like Least Privilege, TCB Minimization, and Self Sandboxing. The most frequent feedback has been "I don't know how to apply this in practice". So, in this talk, I will show how I applied those principles in a real-world software project: a CRUD web app. My blog. I introduced dangerous attack surface on purpose so I could some day give a talk about how to apply these techniques to reduce risk. This is that talk. I will also introduce the concept of append-only data storage.
cerebro, e7p, Steffen Becker
Ensuring the integrity of Integrated Circuits (ICs) against malicious hardware Trojans is paramount for secure electronic devices. One approach involves imaging the manufactured chips to compare them with their original design files. While such techniques for detecting Trojans are relatively well-known in the industry, there is a notable absence of comprehensive, publicly available case studies. To bridge this gap, we unveil a Red Team vs. Blue Team case study on hardware Trojan detection across four digital ICs in various modern feature sizes. We share our findings, algorithms, and image datasets, shedding light on the efficiency of these techniques, and offer insights into the impact of technology scaling on detection performance.
Adam Batori
Following the failure and easy exploitation of the AACSv1 DRM on HD-DVD and Blu-ray, AACS-LA went back to the drawing board and announced the next generation AACSv2 DRM scheme, launching alongside 4K UHD Blu-ray in 2015. Since then, nearly no information has come out publicly about any vulnerabilities or even the algorithms themselves, owing in large part to software players requiring the use of Intel SGX secure enclave technology, which promises integrity and confidentiality of AACSv2 code and data through local and remote attestation mechanisms. Join us as we explore the broken history of AACS, describe practical side-channel attacks against SGX, and present the first look into the inner workings of AACSv2 DRM, culminating in a demonstration of the first full compromise of AACSv2 and unofficial playback of a UHD-BD disc.
Konrad Kohbrok, Raphael Robert
They call it RFC 9420, we say MLS: A new IETF standard for end-to-end encryption was published in July and brings large improvements in performance and security compared to existing protocols. We are here to present Messaging Layer Security, its ecosystem and its roadmap. The MLS protocol is already being used in production to end-to-end encrypt Webex conference calls and will soon provide encryption for Android messages and RCS 2.0 for billions of users. Other messaging tools (such as Discord, Matrix, Wire, etc.) are currently trialing MLS and are expected to follow. Why was the protocol developed in the first place? How does it work? What are the next steps for MLS?
sre
Mainframe, Oldenburg's Hackerspace, needed a wireless door lock solution. We do not trust vendors advertising promises about the device security and had a closer look.