Schedule
Schedule
Martin Tschirsich, Bianca Kastl
In wenigen Wochen werden die Gesundheitsdaten von rund 73 Millionen in Deutschland Krankenversicherten ohne deren Zutun über Praxis- und Krankenhausgrenzen hinweg zentral in einer Akte zusammengeführt - in der [„elektronischen Patientenakte für alle“](https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/themen/digitalisierung/elektronische-patientenakte/epa-fuer-alle.html). Fortsetzung von 36C3 - [„Hacker hin oder her“: Die elektronische Patientenakte kommt!](https://media.ccc.de/v/36c3-10595-hacker_hin_oder_her_die_elektronische_patientenakte_kommt)
Michael Kreil, Flüpke
Bewegungsdaten von 800.000 E-Autos sowie Kontaktinformationen zu den Besitzern standen ungeschützt im Netz. Sichtbar war, wer wann zu Hause parkt, beim BND oder vor dem Bordell.
Ange Albertini
Specifications are enough, they say… 10 years after 31c3's "Funky File Formats" … Have things improved?
kantorkel, Kai Biermann
Du bestellst im Internet? Natürlich bestellst Du im Internet. Aber dieses Mal wird Deine Ware nicht geliefert. Stattdessen sind Dein Geld und Deine Kreditkartendaten nun in China. Das ist BogusBazaar. Wir teilen unsere Einblicke in die Arbeitsweise dieser Bande.
Fabian Bräunlein, Luca Melette
A significant portion of Europe's renewable energy production can be remotely controlled via longwave radio. While this system is intended to stabilize the grid, it can potentially also be abused to destabilize it by remotely toggling energy loads and power plants. In this talk, we will dive into radio ripple control technology, analyze the protocols in use, and discuss whether its weaknesses could potentially be leveraged to cause a blackout, or – more positively – to create a city-wide Blinkenlights-inspired art installation.
Vaisha Bernard
All I wanted was for Microsoft to deliver my phishing simulation. This journey took me from discovering trivial vulnerabilities in Microsoft's Attack Simulation platform, to a Chinese company to which Microsoft outsourced its support department that wanted all my access tokens. I finally ended up hijacking remote PowerShell sessions and obtaining all data from random Microsoft 365 tenants, all the while reeling in bug bounties along the way.
Daniel Gruss, Martin Heckel, Florian Adamsky
The density of memory cells in modern DRAM is so high that disturbance errors, like the Rowhammer effect, have become quite frequent. An attacker can exploit Rowhammer to flip bits in inaccessible memory locations by reading the contents of nearby accessible memory rows. Since its discovery in 2014, we have seen a cat-and-mouse security game with a continuous stream of new attacks and new defenses. Now, in 2024, exactly 10 years after Rowhammer was discovered, it is time to look back and reflect on the progress we have made and give an outlook on the future. Additionally, we will present an open-source framework to check if your system is vulnerable to Rowhammer.
Henryk Plötz
I'll introduce the technology underlying bluetooth trackers from Apple and Google, and will describe and show what can actually be seen on the air (using a hackrf/rad1o for example). This is part demonstration of what is possible right now, part explanation of the underlying principles, and part invitation to would-be hackers to make creative use of this technology.
stacksmashing
With the iPhone 15 & iPhone 15 Pro, Apple switched their iPhone to USB-C and introduced a new USB-C controller: The ACE3, a powerful, very custom, TI manufactured chip. But the ACE3 does more than just handle USB power delivery: It's a full microcontroller running a full USB stack connected to some of the internal busses of the device, and is responsible for providing access to JTAG of the application processor, the internal SPMI bus, etc. We start by investigating the previous variant of the ACE3: The ACE2. It's based on a known chip, and using a combination of a hardware vulnerability in MacBooks and a custom macOS kernel module we managed to persistently backdoor it - even surviving full-system restores. On the ACE3 however, Apple upped their game: Firmware updates are personalized to the device, debug interfaces seem to be disabled, and the external flash is validated and does not contain all the firmware. However using a combination of reverse-engineering, RF side-channel analysis and electro-magnetic fault-injection it was possible to gain code-execution on the ACE3 - allowing dumping of the ROM, and analysis of the functionality. This talk will show how to use a combination of hardware, firmware, reverse-engineering, side-channel analysis and fault-injection to gain code-execution on a completely custom chip, enabling further security research on an under-explored but security relevant part of Apple devices. It will also demonstrate attacks on the predecessor of the ACE3.
Anja Lehmann, socialhack
Digital identity solutions, such as proposed through the EU's eIDAS regulation, are reshaping the way users authenticate online. In this talk, we will review the currently proposed technical designs, the impact such systems will have, and provide an outlook on how techniques from modern cryptography can help to improve security and privacy.
Matthias Frielingsdorf
My talk explores the trajectory of iOS spyware from the initial discovery of Pegasus in 2016 to the latest cases in 2024. The talk will start with an analysis how exploits, infection vectors and methods of commercial spyware on iOS have changed over time. The second section of the talk is all about advances in detection methods and the forensic sources which are available to discover commercial spyware. This talk will also include a Case Study about the discovery and analysis of BlastPass (one of the latest NSO Exploits). The third part will discuss technical challenges and limitations of the detections methods and data sources. Finally, I will conclude the talk with open research topics and suggestions what Apple or we could technically do to make the detection of commercial spyware better.
Adam M.
User location information is inherently privacy sensitive as it reveals a lot about us: Where do we work and live? Which cities, organizations & institutions do we visit? How does our weekly routine look like? When are we on a vacation and not at home? MacOS has introduced multiple layers of security mitigations to protect sensitive user location information from attackers and malicious applications over the years — but are these enough?
LaF0rge (He/him)
Modern high-performance networking APIs on Linux - beyond the classic BSD sockets API.
Luca Di Bartolomeo (cyanpencil), Rokhaya Fall
A bug in a scraper script led to us downloading every single native library in every single Android app ever published in any market (~8 million apps). Instead of deleting this massive dataset and starting again, we foolishly decided to run some binary similarity algos to check if libraries and outdated and still vulnerable to old CVEs. No one told us we were opening Pandora's box. A tragic story of scraping, IP-banning circumvention, love/hate relationships with machine learning, binary similarity party tricks, and an infinite sea of vulnerabilities.
Benjamin W. Broersma
Experiences from a hacker working at the Election Council of The Netherlands.
sather
We present Milksad, our research on a class of vulnerabilities that exposed over a billion dollars worth of cryptocurrency to anyone willing to 'crunch the numbers'. The fatal flaw? Not enough chaos. Learn how we found and disclosed issues in affected open source wallet software, brute-forced thousands of individual affected wallets on a budget, and traced over a billion US dollars worth of prior transactions through them.
Lukas Stennes
We present fatal security flaws in the HALFLOOP-24 encryption algorithm, which is used by the US military and NATO. HALFLOOP-24 was meant to safeguard the automatic link establishment protocol in high frequency radio, but our research demonstrates that merely two hours of intercepted radio traffic are sufficient to recover the secret key. In the talk, we start with the fundamentals of symmetric key cryptography before going into the details of high frequency radio, HALFLOOP-24, and the foundation of our attack.
Sebastian Neef (gehaxelt)
PHUZZ is a framework for Coverage-Guided Fuzzing of PHP Web Applications Fuzz testing is an automated approach to vulnerability discovery. Coverage-guided fuzz testing has been extensively researched in binary applications and the domain of memory corruption vulnerabilities. However, many web vulnerability scanners still rely on black-box fuzzing (e.g., predefined sets of payloads or basic heuristics), which severely limits their vulnerability detection capabilities. In this talk, we present our academic fuzzing framework, "PHUZZ," and the challenges we faced in bringing coverage-guided fuzzing to PHP web applications. Our experiments show that PHUZZ outperforms related works and state-of-the-art vulnerability scanners in discovering seven different vulnerability classes. Additionally, we demonstrate how PHUZZ uncovered over 20 potential security issues and two 0-day vulnerabilities in a large-scale fuzzing campaign of the most popular WordPress plugins.
Nicolas Oberli
The Chipolo ONE is a Bluetooth tracker built around the Dialog (now Renesas) DA14580 chip. This talk will present the research made on this device, from extracting the firmware from the locked down chip using fault injection up to getting remote code execution over Bluetooth. The talk will also present the disclosure process and how the vendor reacted to an unpatchable vulnerability on their product.
Aedan Cullen
Raspberry Pi's RP2350 microcontroller introduced a multitude of new hardware security features over the RP2040, and included a Hacking Challenge which began at DEF CON to encourage researchers to find bugs. The challenge has been defeated and the chip is indeed vulnerable (in at least one way). This talk will cover the process of discovering this vulnerability, the method of exploiting it, and avenues for deducing more about the relevant low-level hardware behavior.
Jurre van Bergen
The digital arms race between activists and government spies continues to shift and evolve. Through a series of cases studies, researchers from Amnesty International's Security Lab will share surveillance wins, the ongoing challenges, and the new threats on the digital horizon.
segher, Wanda
This is the story of the HDCP master key that we derived back in 2010.
Hiro, Gus
Millions of internet users around the world rely on Tor to protect themselves from surveillance and censorship. While Tor-powered applications and the Tor protocol are widely known, the community behind it much less so. This talk will highlight the efforts to maintain a healthy and resilient Tor network, emphasizing the crucial role of a diverse, engaged community of relay operators. We’ll discuss some recent news, the current state of the network, how we determine its health, and the strategies to strengthen its resilience, addressing challenges around sustainability and governance. If you're interested in understanding the inner workings of the Tor network, this talk is for you.
Kaspar
S3 Buckets mit kübelweise privaten Daten: Finden, melden, kein Problem. Aber grundlegend was ändern? Denkste!
Nils Amiet
The whole world is talking about AI, and developers are no exception. When a developer hears about a tool that can help them handle git pull requests using AI, it is likely that they will start using it for their open source project. This is precisely what's happening with Qodo Merge (formerly PR-Agent), an open source tool that can help review and handle git pull requests by using AI to provide feedback and suggestions to developers. It is getting adopted by more and more open source projects, including popular ones. It is so easy to add new features by relying on external tools, yet the consequences on security can be catastrophic. Indeed, if the tool contains security vulnerabilities, the project using it may become vulnerable too and may grant anyone permissions to perform unexpected actions without realizing it. But everyone wants to use AI so security may be overlooked. We found multiple vulnerabilities in Qodo Merge that may lead to privilege escalation on Gitlab, getting write access to Github repositories and leaking Github repository secrets. Additionally we found multiple high profile Github repositories using Qodo Merge with a configuration that makes them vulnerable, such as highly popular projects, government official repositories, self-driving automotive industry projects, blockchains and more. In this talk we go through what Qodo Merge is, how it can be used, how it works, how it can be exploited, what projects are affected and what are the impacts. We also mention remediation steps to fix these issues.
Frieder Steinmetz, Dennis Heinze
Auracast, the new Bluetooth LE Broadcast Audio feature has gained some publicity in the last few months. The Bluetooth SIG has been working on the specification of this feature set in the past few years and vendors are only now starting to implement it. Auracast enables broadcasting audio to multiple devices. These broadcasts can also be encrypted. Unfortunately, the security properties of the protocol are vague and insufficient. It has already been shown that these broadcasts can be hijacked by anyone when unencrypted. We explain the state of (in)security of the protocol and add to it by showing that even when encrypted, broadcasts can often be cracked easily. We also show that once equipped with the passcode, attackers can eavesdrop and hijack even encrypted broadcasts. Alongside the talk, we will release our toolkit to brute-force authentication codes, decrypt dumped Auracast streams, and hijack encrypted broadcasts.
Rick de Jager, Carlo Meijer
Remember the days when faxes were the pinnacle of office tech, and the sound of a paper getting pulled in was as satisfying as a fresh cup of coffee? Well, it's time to dust off those memories and reintroduce ourselves to the quirky world of printers and their forgotten fax interfaces – yes, those relics that make us all feel like we're in an '80ies sci-fi movie – and specifically, how they can unlock a new frontier in printer security exploits!
Wouter Bokslag, Jos Wetzels
In August 2023, we published the TETRA:BURST vulnerabilities - the result of the first public in-depth security analysis of TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio): a European standard for trunked radio globally used by government agencies, police, military, and critical infrastructure. Authentication and encryption within TETRA were handled by proprietary cryptographic cipher-suites, which had remained secret for over two decades through restrictive NDAs until our reverse-engineering and publication. This talk is not TETRA:BURST, but dives into the latest TETRA revision introduced in 2022. Most notably, it contains a new suite of cryptographic ciphers. Of course the cipher available for critical infrastructure and civilian use (TEA7) is intentionally crippled, and of course these ciphers were to be kept secret, but this decision was overruled due to public backlash following our publication last year. In this talk we will present a practical attack on the TEA7 cipher, which while taking a 192-bit key, only offers 56 bits of security. Furthermore, we point out improvements and shortcomings of the new standard, and present an update on TEA3 cryptanalysis, where we previously found a suspicious feature, and draw a parallel with its successor TEA6. All in all, in this short and relatively crypto-forward talk, we assess with all-new material whether the new TETRA standard is fit for its intended purpose. This crucial technology seeks to once again take a very central role in our society for decades to come, and its cryptographic resilience is of fundamental importance - for emergency networks, but possibly even more for our critical infrastructure and associated processes.
Lars König
Ever wondered why your web server seems to be under constant attack from what feels like everyone on the internet? Me too! Join me in this session where we'll explore the data of millions of attacks from hundreds of sensors around the world, to identify who is attacking us from where and why. Additionally, we will have a look into how we can use that data to get abusive systems taken down, and how successful this approach actually is. Buckle up for a deep dive into the constant battle to protect systems on the internet against adversaries gaining access, and how you can help make the internet a safer place!
NiNi Chen
In the October 2023 update, Windows 11 introduced support for 11 additional compression formats, including RAR and 7z, allowing users to manage these types of files natively within File Explorer. The enhancement significantly improves convenience; however, it also introduces potential security risks. To support these various compression formats, Windows 11 utilizes the libarchive library, a well-established open-source library used across multiple operating systems like Linux, BSD, and macOS, and in major projects such as ClickHouse, Homebrew, and Osquery. The libarchive has been continuously fuzzed by Google’s OSS-Fuzz project, making it a time-tested library. However, its coverage in OSS-Fuzz has been less than ideal. In addition to the two remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities disclosed by Microsoft Offensive Research & Security Engineering (MORSE) in January, we have identified several vulnerabilities in libarchive through code review and fuzzing. These include a heap buffer overflow vulnerability in the RAR decompression and arbitrary file write and delete vulnerabilities due to insufficient checks of libarchive’s output on Windows. Additionally, in our presentation, we will reveal several interesting features that emerged from the integration of libarchive with Windows. And whenever vulnerabilities are discovered in widely-used libraries like libarchive, their risks often permeate every corner, making it difficult to estimate the potential hazards. Moreover, when Microsoft patches Windows, the corresponding fixes are not immediately merged into libarchive. This delay gives attackers the opportunity to exploit other projects using libarchive. For example, the vulnerabilities patched by Microsoft in January were not merged into libarchive until May, leaving countless applications exposed to risk for four months. The worst part is that the developers might not know the vulnerability details or even be aware of its existence. To illustrate this situation, we will use the vulnerabilities we reported to ClickHouse as an example to demonstrate how attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities while libarchive remains unpatched.