Preface

The worst part of censorship is XXXXX Investigating large-scale Internet content

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23C3, Berlin/Germany, December 29th, 2006



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Preface

Outline

- Preface
- 1
- Filtering techniques
 - Introduction
 - Network-level filtering
 - Application-level filtering
- 2 Filtering by example: China
 - Introduction
 - Practical implications
- 3 Circumventing the filtering
 - Overview
 - Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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Preface

Hey, who the f*** are you?

- Just a random stranger interested in network security, penetration testing and IT forensics.
- Worked with Ernst & Young's penetration testing team in Germany and Ireland for four years.
- Currently part of T-Mobile's network security team in Germany.
- Formally graduated as Master of Science in Security and Forensic Computing.

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<ad>Studying IT security</ad>

- If you are interested in getting a formal education in the area of IT security, consider a course offered by the Dublin City University (DCU) in Dublin/Ireland.
- The DCU is offering a one-year full-time Masters programme (called MSSF) which deals with IT security (e.g. the modules are including network security, secure coding, cryptography, formal software verification, biometrics, ...) as well as the practical investigation of computer crime and the principles underlying its prevention.
- Check out http://www.dcu.ie (-> Prospective students -> Postgraduate -> Faculty of Engineering & Computing) for more information.

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• No, I am NOT paid to say this :-)

Preface

Motivation

- My Chinese room mate at DCU ("Censorship? What do you mean by that?").
- Curiosity.
- Consider recent events (blocking order in parts of Germany or allofmp3.com in Denmark).
- Large-scale Internet filtering is an area that still needs a lot of research.

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Introduction Network-level filtering Application-level filtering

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SAR

Outline

Preface



Filtering techniques

- Introduction
- Network-level filtering
- Application-level filtering
- 2 Filtering by example: China
 - Introduction
 - Practical implications
- 3 Circumventing the filtering
 - Overview
 - Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

Introduction Network-level filtering Application-level filtering

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Types of filtering

Network-level filtering

- Layer 3
- Layer 4


Application-level filtering

- Proxies
- Deep Packet Inspection
- DNS manipulations

Introduction Network-level filtering Application-level filtering

Filtering & the OSI model

OSI model



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
Introduction Network-level filtering Application-level filtering

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
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Proxy servers



Introduction Network-level filtering Application-level filtering

Deep Packet Inspection




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Introduction Network-level filtering Application-level filtering

DNS manipulations



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Introduction Network-level filtering Application-level filtering

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Demo #1 - DNS manipulations

A demonstration of state-decreed DNS manipulations ("blocking order") in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. These manipulations will prevent users based in this part of Germany from resolving and thus connecting to a number of Nazi-related websites (e.g. www.stormfront.org).

Introduction Practical implications

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SAR

Outline




- Filtering techniques
 - Introduction
 - Network-level filtering
 - Application-level filtering

2 Filtering by example: China

- Introduction
- Practical implications
- 3 Circumventing the filtering
 - Overview
 - Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

Introduction Practical implications

Introduction



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Introduction Practical implications

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Introduction (cont.)

Forbidden and thus blocked information are including (but not limited to):

- Any information contradicting the constitution of the Peoples Republic of China.
- Any information disclosing state secrets, violating national security, subverting the government or destroying the unity of the country.
- Any information damaging the honour and the interests of the state.
- Any information disturbing social order or undermining social stability.
- Any information spreading or instigating lewdness, pornography, gambling, violence, murder or terror.

Introduction Practical implications

The Domain Name System

- In order to discover whether this type of manipulation is used by the Chinese government, 50 sample domains were resolved simultaneously in an automated manner on a Chinese and a German server.
- The sample dataset contained the addresses of well-known political or religious organizations as well as television channels, newspapers and other popular domains.
- The German server resolved all 50 domains correctly, whereas the Chinese server failed to resolve approx. 20% of the samples.

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The Domain Name System (cont.)

The following domains could not be correctly resolved in China:

Domain	Description	Result
www.falundafa.org	Spiritual movement	SERVFAIL
www.amnesty.org	Human rights org.	SERVFAIL
www.bbc.co.uk	Television channel	SERVFAIL
www.wikipedia.org	Online encyclopedia	SERVFAIL
www.cnn.com	Television channel	SERVFAIL
www.greenpeace.org	Non-profit organis.	SERVFAIL
www.playboy.com	Adult entertainment	SERVFAIL
www.gov.tw	Taiwanese governm.	Timeout
www.worldpress.org	News	Timeout

Introduction Practical implications

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Demo #2 - DNS manipulations (in China)

The Chinese government employs DNS tampering to prevent users from resolving certain domains (e.g. www.amnesty.org).

Introduction Practical implications

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Search engines

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Google Web Images Groups News Froogle more » dublin city university Search Preferences
Web

Your search - dublin city university - did not match any documents.

Suggestions:

- · Make sure all words are spelled correctly.
- · Try different keywords.
- Try more general keywords.
- Try fewer keywords.

Introduction Practical implications

Search engines

All major search engines (e.g. MSN, Yahoo, Google, Baidu) are subject to filtering in China. The filtering is based on:

- Website de-listing: A manipulation in which an undesirable website is deliberately removed (delisted) from the list of search results.
- Keyword censorship: A technique that prevents users from searching for specific keywords.

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
Introduction Practical implications

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Web browsing



Introduction Practical implications

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Demo #3 - Forged RST packets

The traffic is inspected for certain keywords (e.g. Falun Gong, Tibet, Taiwan). Once such a keyword has been identified, the connection between the two communication partners is deliberately cut off by sending forged RST packets to both endpoints.

Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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SAR

Outline



- Filtering techniques
 - Introduction
 - Network-level filtering
 - Application-level filtering
- 2 Filtering by example: China
 - Introduction
 - Practical implications

Oircumventing the filtering

- Overview
- Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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Introduction

Given enough creativity and knowledge, every filtering can typically be circumvented in three steps:

- Attempting to enumerate the magnitude and strictness of the filtering.
- Making an educated guess about the functionality of the filtering mechanism (e.g. layer 3 or 4 filtering).
- Selecting an appropriate circumvention technique based step 2.


Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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The Clayton method




Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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Alternative DNS servers




Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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
Alternative proxies



Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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Tunneling



Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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Demo #4 - SSH tunneling

Probably the most elegant way of circumvention: Establishing a cryptographically secure tunnel to a remote system via SSH and forwarding a local port to a HTTP proxy server running on the same or even a different remote host.

Overview Defeating the "Great Firewall of China"

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Call for support

I am looking for people interested in doing some more research in the area of large-scale filtering. Gimme a shout if you are interested.

Summary

- The Chinese government operates the most extensive and pervasive system of Internet filtering in the world.
- This practicum investigated a variety of techniques to successfully circumvent this filtering.
- However in order to enable even the average user to defeat the filtering, other and especially easier circumvention methods must be developed...

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That's it, folks.

Thanks for listening. I am now looking forward to answering your questions.

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