



PCD to PICC communication

14443A Card

Logic
Analyser

PICC to PCD communication





Power
On/Off
Switch

To Logic Analyzer

To Logic Analyzer

Strategy:

- 1) Turn everything off
- 2) Start capture on logic analyzer
- 3) Switch on PCD, automatically boots firmware and performs authentication
- 4) Stop capture and save data
- 5) Put data through Manchester/Miller decoder (and filter out authentication frames)
- 6) Restart from step 1


First few mutual authentication exchanges observed:

PICC: FF 1 CF 1 80 0 E3 0

PCD: 38 1! C5 1 B5 1! 45 0 84 0! D5 1! 04 0 7F 1!

PICC: DF 0 58 1! 61 1! B3 0

PICC: 7D 1 DA 0 7E 1 41 1 

 PCD: 1E 0! 98 1! 43 1! FB 1! D6 0 CD 1! 65 0! E5 1!


PICC: A6 1 23 1! 0A 1 9C 1

PICC: 7D 1 DA 0 7E 1 41 1 

PCD: 53 1 03 1 8F 1! 3A 1 66 0! 85 1! D5 1! 48 0!

PICC: 87 0! 8E 0! 75 0 D3 1!

PICC: 7D 1 DA 0 7E 1 41 1 

 PCD: 1E 0! 98 1! 43 1! FB 1! D6 0 CD 1! 65 0! E5 1!

PICC: A6 1 23 1! 0A 1 9C 1

Statistics for 27 trials

Count	PICC->PCD							PCD->PICC											
1	3C	1	1E	1	85	0	D2	1	AE	1!	29	0	3E	1!	97	0	8D	1	...
1	4D	1	23	0	ED	1	A6	1	57	0	3F	1	5E	1!	F2	0	B5	0	...
1	4D	1	23	0	ED	1	A6	1	76	1!	DF	1!	E3	0	1C	1!	CD	1!	...
3	77	1	3F	1	BF	0	EE	1	10	1!	B9	0	B0	0	14	1	37	0	...
1	77	1	3F	1	BF	0	EE	1	34	1!	13	1!	9B	1!	9B	1!	F2	0	...
6	7D	1	DA	0	7E	1	41	1	1E	0!	98	1!	43	1!	FB	1!	D6	0	...
4	7D	1	DA	0	7E	1	41	1	52	0	68	0	D8	1	63	0!	BB	1	...
1	7D	1	DA	0	7E	1	41	1	53	1	03	1	8F	1!	3A	1	66	0!	...
1	7D	1	DA	0	7E	1	41	1	C3	1	40	1!	90	0!	30	0!	6D	1!	...
1	B2	1	E8	1	CD	0	40	0	23	0	66	0!	5A	0!	C3	0!	46	1!	...
1	B2	1	E8	1	CD	0	40	0	8E	1	05	0!	58	0	26	1!	15	1!	...
1	BB	1	9F	1	5F	1	77	1	45	0	80	1!	7B	1	0B	0	92	1!	...
1	BB	1	9F	1	5F	1	77	1	49	1!	11	0!	98	1!	B1	1	67	0	...
2	E4	1	56	1	36	1	BB	1	7A	1!	AB	1!	A3	1	D9	0	A2	0	...
1	E4	1	56	1	36	1	BB	1	F6	1	23	0	70	1!	F9	1	A9	1	...
1	FF	1	CF	1	80	0	E3	0	38	1!	C5	1	B5	1!	45	0	84	0!	...

The initial state of the cipher must be derived from UID and key, e.g. by xoring UID and key (or similar function).


Idea: Flipping a bit of the key and flipping the corresponding bit in the UID (on the PCD side) should yield the same initial state.

Results:	Bit flipped in UID	Bit flipped in key	
	0	0	success
	1	1	success
	2	2	success
	3	3	success
	4	4	success
	5	5	no success

Next idea: Flipping one bit in the key might need
flipping multiple bits in the UID to reach the same state

Bit flipped in key	Bits flipped in UID				in hex	equals
0	0	0	success		0x1	
1	1	1	success		0x2	0x1 << 1
2	2	2	success		0x4	0x2 << 1
3	3	3	success		0x8	0x4 << 1
4	4	4	success		0x10	0x8 << 1
5	0 5	0 5	success		0x21	(0x10 << 1) 1
6	1 6	1 6	success		0x42	0x21 << 1
7	2 7	2 7	success		0x84	0x42 << 1
8	3 8	3 8	success		0x108	0x84 << 1
9	4 9	4 9	no success		0x210	0x108 << 1
9	0 4 9	0 4 9	success		0x211	(0x108 << 1) 1
10	1 5 10	1 5 10	no success		0x422	0x211 << 1
10	0 1 5 10	0 1 5 10	success		0x423	(0x211 << 1) 1
11	1 2 6 11	1 2 6 11	success		0x846	0x423 << 1
...						
31	2 4 6 7 12 14 16 17 19 21 22 26 31		success		0x846b50d4	

Consequence: Corresponding key/uid pairs can be generated that yield the same initial cipher state.



Given uid_x, key_x and uid_y we can generate key_y
Enables UID/card spoofing when the key is known **without knowledge of the algorithm**

Example usage:

